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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION**

19 DAVID L. DEFREES, et al., ) Case No. CV 11-04272 JLS (SPx),  
20 v. ) consolidated with:  
Plaintiffs, ) No. CV 11-04574 JLS (SPx)

21 JOHN C. KIRKLAND, et al., ) **SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF  
LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL  
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS  
FROM DEFENDANT MCKENNA LONG  
& ALDRIDGE LLP**

22 Defendants, )  
and ) **DISCOVERY MATTER**

23 U.S. AEROSPACE, INC. )  
Nominal Defendant. ) DATE: October 11, 2016  
TIME: 10:00 a.m.  
PLACE: Courtroom 3 or 4 – 3rd Floor  
JUDGE: Hon. Sheri Pym

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1     **I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS TIMELY**

2         McKenna's claim that Plaintiffs<sup>1</sup> motion is unreasonably delayed is  
 3 unfounded. Plaintiffs were unable to make their motion until McKenna produced its  
 4 Second Amended Privilege Log, which it didn't do until August 8, 2016. Rather  
 5 than move to compel concerning a log that Plaintiffs knew that McKenna was  
 6 updating, Plaintiffs properly chose to wait until it had McKenna's final log to file its  
 7 motion.<sup>2</sup> This new log illustrated for the first time that McKenna was claiming a  
 8 privilege over documents previously undisclosed. Moreover, McKenna told  
 9 Plaintiffs it would "clarify various other privilege descriptions" in its log (*see* Joint  
 10 Stipulation at 3 and 18), and until Plaintiffs had those they could not decide whether  
 11 to move to compel production of those documents. McKenna's position is all the  
 12 more unreasonable considering that for months McKenna stood on meritless  
 13 privilege arguments, resulting in successive hearings on a previous motion to  
 14 compel against McKenna, as the Court is fully aware. *See* No. CV 11-04574, ECF  
 15 Nos. 321, 327, 397, 399. Moreover, McKenna's counsel, Allan Edmiston, notified  
 16 Plaintiffs' counsel on August 7, 2016 that he would be on vacation until August 31,  
 17 2016.<sup>3</sup> Under these circumstances, McKenna's argument that Plaintiffs delayed  
 18 unreasonably in bringing this Motion is wholly without basis.<sup>4</sup>

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20         <sup>1</sup> "Plaintiffs" are Frederick Rich, CAMOFI Master LDC and CAMHZN Master  
 21 LDC. "McKenna" is McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP (f/k/a/ Luce Forward  
 22 Hamilton & Scripps LLP.

23         <sup>2</sup> In fact, McKenna added twenty-two (22) entries to its Second Amended  
 24 Privilege Log that were not on the prior version, and ten (10) of them are the subject  
 25 of this motion (Nos. 161-170).

26         <sup>3</sup> Supplemental Declaration of Rachele R. Rickert in Further Support of Motion  
 27 to Compel Production of Documents from Defendant McKenna Long & Aldridge  
 28 LLP, Exhibit ("Ex.") A.

29         <sup>4</sup> For this reason, *Patriot Rail Corp. v. Sierra R.R. Co.*, No. 2:09-cv-00009-  
 30 MCE-EFB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83999, at \*7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) is  
 31 distinguishable because the plaintiff "offer[ed] no explanation for why it waited 44  
 32 . . . days to file the motion, despite the fact that all other significant discovery  
 33 deadlines, as well as the last day to file dispositive motions had long expired." *Id.*  
 34 Here, Plaintiffs have provided a reasonable explanation for the timing of the filing  
 35 of their motion, and the discovery cut-off has not yet passed.

1           McKenna's claim that Plaintiffs filed their motion to compel after the last day  
 2 to file motions is perplexing. The Court's May 23, 2016 Order (ECF No. 406) does  
 3 say that the "last day to file motions (excluding *Daubert* motions and motions in  
 4 limine) shall be September 6, 2016." *Id.* at 2. However, the Order also provides  
 5 that the fact discovery cut-off is not until October 3, 2016. Plaintiffs have always  
 6 interpreted the September 6, 2016 deadline as applying to dispositive motions (such  
 7 as motions for summary judgment). Here, the discovery cut-off is not until October  
 8 3, 2016. "A motion to compel filed during the discovery period would rarely be  
 9 considered untimely." *Gault v. Nabisco Biscuit Co.*, 184 F.R.D. 620, 621 (D. Nev.  
 10 1999) (facts are distinguishable as the plaintiff filed his motion to compel "seventy-  
 11 six days (76) after the close of discovery.") In any event, McKenna has waived any  
 12 objection on this basis by remaining silent after being advised on August 31, 2016,  
 13 that Plaintiffs intended to file their motion on September 9, 2016.

14           **II. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MCKENNA AND OUTSIDE PR  
 15 CONSULTANTS ARE NOT PRIVILEGED**

16           McKenna is claiming attorney-client and Work Product protection for fifty-  
 17 eight (58) documents which are email communications between McKenna and its  
 18 outside public relations ("PR") consultants (hereafter referred to as the "PR  
 19 Emails").<sup>5</sup> With the exception of two emails (Nos. 36 and 58), the PR Emails do not  
 20 include either of Messrs. Scott Sonne or Lawrence Kouns, the two members of  
 21 McKenna's Office of the General Counsel ("OGC") at the time.

22           In California the attorney-client privilege only applies to communications  
 23 involving the giving and receiving of *legal* advice. *Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v Super. Ct.*,  
 24 155 Cal. App. 4th 1485, 1502 (2007). If the documents do not discuss legal advice  
 25 from counsel, there is no privilege. *Id.* Moreover, the presence of third parties  
 26 destroys any confidentiality associated with the communication and hence the

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27           <sup>5</sup> The fifty-eight (58) PR Emails are Nos. 3, 5-9, 11-23, 26-28, 30-32, 35-36,  
 28 38, 40-50, 53-60, 63, 67-70, 97, 135-137, 162, and 163 on the Second Amended  
 Privilege Log. *See Declaration of Rachele R. Rickert in Support of Joint Stipulation*  
 (filed Sept. 9, 2016) ("Rickert Decl."), Ex. A.

1 privilege, unless the presence of those third parties is reasonably necessary to  
 2 accomplish the purpose for which counsel has been consulted. *Id.*

3 Here, the PR consultants were not retained by the OGS; they were retained by  
 4 Ramona Cyr Whitley, Director of Marketing and Business Development, at Mr.  
 5 Kicklighter's direction. Declaration of Kurt L. Kicklighter (ECF No. 438-4), ¶ 3.  
 6 Mr. Kicklighter's declaration reveals that he consulted with the OGC, who appears  
 7 to have recommended the firm retain PR consultants, and it did. *Id.* The outside PR  
 8 consultants were not hired to collaborate with McKenna's OGC and assist it in  
 9 giving legal advice to McKenna. Rather, the PR firm was hired "to monitor,  
 10 manage and, as appropriate, address the publicity and press inquiries." *Id.* Public  
 11 relations consulting is a business service, not a legal service. Moreover, the fact that  
 12 Mr. Sonne was copied on two of the emails does not mean they are privileged.  
 13 "[N]onprivileged communications between corporate officers or employees  
 14 transacting the general business of the company do not attain privileged status solely  
 15 because in-house or outside counsel is 'copied in' on correspondence or  
 16 memoranda." *Zurich*, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1504.

17 McKenna is inappropriately attempting to shield communications between  
 18 non-attorney McKenna personnel and the PR consultants by asking this Court to  
 19 apply the "functional equivalent of an employee" test. However, even  
 20 communications with "functional employees" are not protected if the  
 21 communications are not with an attorney and are not made for the purpose of giving  
 22 and receiving legal advice. *See Exp.-Imp. Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp &*  
*23 Paper Co., Ltd.*, 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (functional equivalent test  
 24 only protects "communications between a company's lawyers and its independent  
 25 contractor[s]" "if, by virtue of assuming the functions and duties of full-time  
 26 employee, the contractor is a *de facto* employee of the company.")<sup>6</sup> Therefore, even

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27       <sup>6</sup> A consultant is considered the functional equivalent of an employee when he  
 28 "had primary responsibility for a key corporate job, . . . there was a continuous and  
 close working relationship between the consultant and the company's principals on  
 matters critical to the company's position in litigation, . . . and . . . the consultant is

1 if the court were to find the PR consultants were “functional employees” of  
 2 McKenna (a finding not warranted here), the communications, with only two  
 3 exceptions, were not with McKenna’s lawyers—*i.e.*, its OGC—and therefore are not  
 4 privileged.<sup>7</sup> *See Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH*,  
 5 No. 14-cv-585, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175552, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014) (a  
 6 marketing firm hired to assist in a complicated product roll-out was not the  
 7 functional equivalent of an employee); *In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust*  
 8 *Litig.*, MDL No. 140, M 21-95, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18636, at \*7-8 (S.D.N.Y.  
 9 Oct. 21, 2003) (consultant’s “role is akin to that of an accountant or other ordinary  
 10 third party specialist, disclosure to whom destroys the attorney-client privilege.”).

11 **III. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS AT MCKENNA ARE NOT  
 12 PRIVILEGED**

13 The attorney-client privilege also does not apply to the thirty-one (31) email  
 14 communications between and amongst attorneys and personnel at McKenna,  
 15 because they do not involve McKenna’s OGC or any outside attorney, and the  
 16 descriptions of the documents do not indicate that they contain a discussion of legal  
 17 advice or the strategy of counsel. *See Rickert Decl.*, Ex. A, Nos. 4, 10, 29, 34, 71-  
 18 73, 80, 96, 99, 103-05, 118-20, 127-28, 134, 140, 143, 146, 148, 151-152, 157, 159,  
 19 164, 168, 170 and 179. *See Zurich*, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1502 (if the documents do  
 20 not discuss “legal advice from counsel . . . there is no privilege.”); *see also id.* at  
 21 1503.<sup>8</sup> McKenna does not adequately explain why these documents are privileged.

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22 likely to possess information possessed by no one else at the company.” *Id.*  
 23 (citations omitted). McKenna’s PR consultants were none of these.

24 <sup>7</sup> California law applies here, but even the federal cases McKenna cites are  
 25 distinguishable since the consultants in those cases were found to be “functional  
 26 employees” whose communications *with counsel* to the corporation or partnership  
 27 were privileged because they were interacting with the corporation’s or  
 28 partnership’s *counsel* to assist *counsel* in the rendering of *legal advice* to the  
 corporation or partnership. *See* cases cited in Joint Stipulation at 21-25.

<sup>8</sup> Plaintiff has removed nine (9) documents from this category (Nos. 121-22,  
 124, 126, 130-33, and 161) given Mr. Kouns’ declaration that he asked Jeffrey  
 Wexler to assist the OGC. Declaration of Lawrence J. Kouns (ECF No. 438-5), ¶ 3.  
 These communications are addressed in section IV.

1 It is not enough that McKenna’s “OGC was conducting an investigation of  
 2 allegations” when these communications were made, or that they “related to  
 3 adversaries in this litigation,” or that they “discuss[] the subject matter of this  
 4 litigation shortly after it commenced,” or that they “relate[] the firm’s response to a  
 5 subpoena for USAE’s files and other firm management and representation matters.”  
 6 Joint Stipulation at 27-29. If they do not reflect attorney-client communications,  
 7 they are not privileged.

8 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW *IN CAMERA* THE EMAILS WHICH  
 9 INCLUDE THE OGC OR ITS AGENT**

10 Plaintiff requests the Court conduct an *in camera* review to determine  
 11 whether the communications between Kirkland and the OGC and/or Jeffrey Wexler  
 12 are privileged (Nos. 24, 25, 33, 37, 39, 51, 52, 98, 100-02, 106-10, 112-17, 122-26,  
 13 129-33, 141-42, 144-45, 147, 149-50, 153, 155-56, 161) and whether the inclusion  
 14 of McKenna personnel in other emails with the OGC (or its agent) (Nos. 37, 111,  
 15 121, 138-39, 154, 165-67, 169) was “reasonably necessary for the transmission of  
 16 the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which [a] lawyer is  
 17 consulted. *Zurich*, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1503.”

18 **V. NONE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ARE WORK PRODUCT**

19 McKenna has not met its burden of establishing that any of the documents  
 20 listed on the privilege log were prepared in anticipation of litigation and are  
 21 therefore work product. *United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land*, 107 F.R.D. 20, 22  
 22 (N.D. Cal. 1985). Its only references to the work product doctrine are in passing  
 23 and in a conclusory manner.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, McKenna has conceded the argument.

24 DATED: September 27, 2016

**WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER  
 FREEMAN & HERZ LLP**

25 By: /s/ Rachele R. Rickert  
 26 RACHELE R. RICKERT

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27  
 28 <sup>9</sup> See Joint Stipulation at 21 (“all of these confidential communications with  
 public relations consultants are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work  
 product doctrine”) & 27 (referencing the doctrine in a parenthetical).

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23 DATED: September 27, 2016

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30 *and CAMHZN Master LDC*

1                   **DECLARATION CONCERNING CONCURRENCE**

2                   I, Rachele R. Rickert, am the CM/ECF User whose identification and  
3 password are being used to file this SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF  
4 LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL  
5 PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT McKENNA LONG &  
6 ALDRIDGE LLP. In compliance with L.R. 5-4.3.4(a)(2)(i), I hereby attest that  
7 Michael C. Hefter has concurred in this filing's content and has authorized its filing.

8  
9 DATED: September 27, 2016

By: /s/ Rachele R. Rickert  
10                   RACHELE R. RICKERT

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